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Abstract: Matters of border control in twenty-first century Japan interact with 
current social issues involvingdemography,  the  labour market, and economic 
relationships with other countries in the region. Japan faces a rapidly aging population, 
the highest life expectancy in the world, a birthrate well below replacement level, and a 
shrinking population. Smaller families find it difficult to provide primary care for the 
sick, the elderly and those with disabilities, and the welfare system is stretched to the 
limit. At the same time, Japanese people are increasingly  unwilling to undertake work 
regarded as ‘manual labour’ or ‘unskilled labour’ Thus, the management of border control 
is related to the labour market, and the management of welfare. This is a range of policies 
which I would like to refer to as involving the management of bodies. This article thus 
focuses on ‘the management of borders’ and the ‘management of bodies’ in 
contemporary Japan. 
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* 
In April 2009 it was reported that the Japanese government was offering a one-off 
grant of ¥300,000 (approximately US$3,000) per person to some immigrant workers in 
order to facilitate their return to their homelands.1 The offer was directed at immigrant 
workers of Japanese descent– colloquially known as Nikkei-jin – who had been 
encouraged to come and work in Japan in the 1990s from Peru, Brazil and other parts of 
Latin America (‘Axed Brazilians, Peruvians to be paid to leave Japan’, 2009). The 
community of these immigrants and their families has thus existed in Japan for close to 
two decades. 
The report that Japan was trying to find a way of encouraging these immigrants to 
return to their countries of birth suggests that we are entering a new iteration of the cycles 
of labour mobility between Japan and other nations. Recent trends in labour mobility 
reflect Japan’s place as one of the most influential economies in the Asia-Pacific region – 
even in the wake of the global financial crisis – and as one of the magnets for 
documented and undocumented migrant labour. The changing fortunes of these labour 
immigrants of Japanese heritage also, however, need to be placed in the context of a 
longer history of emigration and immigration, dating back to the nineteenth century. The 
‘Nikkei’ immigrants are the descendants of those who left Japanese rural areas in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century to escape rural poverty, with the encouragement of 
the governments of the time (Befu 2000: 17–40; Dresner 2008: 66–94; Quan 2004: 339–
367). In 2007 it was estimated that there were 2.15 million registered foreign residents in 
Japan, nearly twice as many as in 1990. This figure would include these recent 
immigrants, but also the (non-naturalised) descendants of Korean and Taiwanese families 
who have been in Japan since the colonial period (Daimon 2009), and smaller numbers of 
skilled sojourners, trainees and international students. There are an estimated 110,000 
unregistered foreign residents (‘Editorial: The foreign residents among us’ 2009).2 
Several other recent reports further suggest that this first decade of the twenty-first 
century is an important period in the management of borders in contemporary Japan. 
There have been controversies concerning requests for permanent residency by some who 
had originally entered illegally or had overstayed (Fukue and Matsutani 2009; ‘10-year 
overstayer is granted new visa’, 2009). Other controversies concern the nationality of 
descendants of Japanese fathers and non-Japanese mothers (Agnote 2008a; 2009); and 
there has been discussion of whether to remove restrictions on dual nationality (Matsutani 
2009). We have also seen new international agreements directed at encouraging the 
temporary migration of care workers to Japan from Indonesia and the Philippines 
(Agnote 2008b; Kaneko 2009, Itô 2008; Itô in press). Meanwhile, the government is 
gradually reforming its border control regime. In this article, I will consider these recent 
issues of border control, and how they interact with the management of the labour market 
and the management of social policy issues. 
These matters of border control interact with current social issues involving the 
changing demography of Japan, a changing labour market, and changing economic 
relationships with other countries in the region. Japan is now facing a rapidly aging 
population with the highest life expectancy in the world, a birthrate well below 
replacement level, and a shrinking population. Smaller families find it difficult to provide 
primary care for the sick, the elderly and those with disabilities, and the welfare system is 
stretched to the limit. At the same time, Japanese people, until recently, almost 
universally saw themselves as ‘middle-class’, and have been unwilling to undertake types 
of work regarded as ‘manual labour’ or ‘unskilled labour’.3 Thus, as I shall argue below, 
the management of border control is also related to the labour market, the management of 
welfare, and the state of the caring professions. This is a range of policies which I would 
like to refer to as involving the management of bodies. This article thus focuses on ‘the 
management of borders’ and the ‘management of bodies’ in contemporary Japan.  
The ‘management of bodies’ could also be framed in terms of Foucault’s concept of 
‘biopower’. As biopower, individuals are mobilised by the state as resources: as workers, 
as citizens, and as family members responsible for the reproduction of the population 
(Foucault 1980: 138–145; Schirato and Webb 2003: 135). In the current age of economic 
globalisation, however, the management of biopower is also a matter which crosses 
national boundaries. Global corporations attempt to maximise profits through accessing 
cheaper labour power. Or, as Hancock et al explain, ‘transnational capitalism demands 
flexible bodies for flexible accumulation’ (2000: 1).  While workers attempt to maximise 
their income through crossing national borders, nation-states attempt to regulate these 
flows through border controls  (Mackie and Stevens 2009: 260).  
Japan’s Demographic Challenge 
In April 2009, a Japanese government white paper reiterated that ‘Japan is graying 
and its birthrate is falling faster than any other country in the world’ (‘Japan birthrate fall 
world's No. 1’, 2009). Japan's total fertility rate – the average number of children born 
per woman aged between 15 and 49 – dropped continuously until the early 2000s. The 
fertility rate was 2.16 in 1971, 1.29 in 2004, bottoming out at 1.26 in 2005, then inching 
up to 1.34 in 2007. Japan has the highest life expectancy in the world: 85.62 years for 
women; 78.8 years for men; and 82.12 for the total population. Young people are 
marrying later, having fewer children, and the mean age at which women have their first 
child rose from 25.6 in 1970 to 28.9 in 2004. An increase in the number of irregular 
workers and the worsening employment situation also contribute to a reluctance to marry 
and have children. The population is shrinking. It stood at 127,692,000 as of Oct. 1, 2008, 
down 0.06 percent from the previous year. In 2005, the number of deaths surpassed that 
of births for the first time by 21,266. In 2008, there were a record 51,317 more deaths 
than births. It is estimated that the population will shrink to about 90 million by 2055 
(‘Editorial: Raising the Birthrate’. 2009). 
Currently, in Japan there are two bulges in the population chart: those from the 
postwar baby boom who are at or close to retirement age; and those in their thirties, born 
in the secondary boom of the 1970s. People aged 65 or older accounted for 22.5 percent 
of Japan's total population as of April 2009, and this is projected to increase to around 35 
per cent by 2050. In 2004, an astonishing 1.02 million persons (out of a total population 
of 127.69 million) in Japan were aged 90 or more. In April 2009 there were an estimated 
17.14 million children under the age of 15, or 13.4 per cent of the population, marking a 
record low for the 28th straight year (‘Number of Children continues to fall’. 2009).  
If we add up the population under 15 and the population over 65 and divide this by 
the productive population (those from 15 to 64) we get a dependent population rate of 
around 50 per cent. In other words, the two thirds of the population of productive age 
have to work to support the other third who are too old or too young to work. The 
productive population is expected to decline from 81.64 million in 2009 to 45.95 million 
in 2055. This is a matter of economics (of paying for pensions, welfare and medical care 
from the taxes of a shrinking labour force) but also a matter of labour (of finding the 
labour power to deal with the physical care of the aged).4 As Huguet points out, in order 
to improve this ratio, Japan would need to raise its birth rate, raise its retirement age, and 
allow substantial increases in the immigration of people of working age (Huguet 2003: 
107–124). The government’s efforts to raise the birth rate have been ineffective, (Roberts 
2002) and the crisis in elder care has been dealt with by encouraging the immigration of 
workers on a temporary basis, as will be discussed below. 
Imagine a married woman in her fifties, whose husband is the primary 
breadwinner.5 It is likely that her parents and her husband’s parents will be alive and in 
their late seventies. One or more of her grandparents might be still be alive and in their 
nineties. She might be engaged in part-time work, but will have to juggle work with 
caring for the needs of aging parents and in-laws who may or may not live close by. 
Many such women give up paid work in order to manage the care of aging relatives. The 
government has attempted to deal with these issues with a system of carers’ insurance 
(Kaigo Hoken Hô/Law Concerning Insurance for Nursing Care, 1997, amended 2000), 
but carers are likely to be employed on a casual or part-time basis. This means that 
someone has to manage the activities and timetabling of relatives, paid carers and 
volunteers, and this burden falls disproportionately on women. 
Until the 1990s, it seemed unimaginable that Japan might consider the use of the 
services of immigrant workers in order to deal with the crisis in elder care. In the first 
decade of the twenty-first century, however, this has become a reality. As there are not 
enough Japanese workers willing or able to engage in caring labour, it has become 
necessary to bring in immigrant workers who are qualified as nurses or carers. 
Nevertheless, the scale and forms of such immigration are being closely controlled and 
monitored. At the same time, there has been a decline in the kind of manufacturing and 
labouring jobs which have been filled by short-term labour immigrants in recent years. 
Managing the Labour Market 
In the latter decades of the twentieth century, the Japanese economy gradually 
shifted from one based on agriculture and manufacturing to a largely post-industrial 
economy based on services, technology, knowledge, information and finance. In 2008 
primary industry accounted for 4.2 percent of employment, secondary industry 26.4 
percent and tertiary industry 68.2 percent. There has been a steady decline in the 
percentage of workers engaged in primary industry throughout the post-World War II 
period; the number engaged in manufacturing has shown a decline in every year since 
1993 (except for a brief upturn in 2006); and there has been a corresponding increase in 
the percentage of workers engaged in tertiary industry from 1980 to the present (Statistics 
Bureau, Japan, 2009: 132). 
From the 1970s to the 1990s, a large part of manufacturing production was moved 
offshore, in search of looser environmental controls, weaker labour unions, and cheaper 
labour power. Some sectors of manufacturing, involving sub-contracting and sub-sub-
contracting to the large industrial conglomerates, did, however, stay onshore, and this 
work was variously undertaken by married women in part-time or casual positions, rural 
labour on a seasonal basis, and from the 1980s by immigrant labour. Some immigrants 
worked legally as kenshûsei (trainees) on limited term contracts and short-term visas, 
while others entered on tourist visas and overstayed. The construction industry also 
became reliant on (largely undocumented) immigrant labour in these years (Yamanaka 
2000: 63). The savings to employers are not necessarily in wages. Rather, irregular 
workers ‘cost their employers significantly less because they do not receive the numerous 
expensive benefits, entitlements and job security that Japanese regular employees do’ 
(Yamanaka 2000: 87–88). 
For the last decade, however, the automotive industry has been in crisis. This crisis 
has been reflected in a number of mergers between Japanese and European automobiIe 
manufacturers. This has also resulted in the hiring of managers from overseas, such as the 
high profile Carlos Ghosn, CEO of Nissan since 1999 on its merger with Renault. This 
crisis deepened in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. The collapse 
of the automobile industry is significant for it was formerly one of the mainstays of the 
economy and a major export industry, and wages for skilled workers in this sector to a 
large extent determined wages in other sectors. Subcontractors to this industry have, more 
recently, been major employers of labour immigrants, and thus it is these immigrants who 
have been disproportionately affected by the most recent economic downturn (‘Axed 
Brazilians, Peruvians to be paid to leave Japan’, 2009). Trainees (kenshûsei) have also 
been affected. Data from the Japan International Training Cooperation Organization 
show that the number of companies’ applications for permitting foreigners into Japan as 
trainees or technical interns in October 2008 fell 18.8 percent from a year earlier to 
4,753; the figure for November 2008 stood at 4,692, down 25.5 percent from a year 
before. The number of people entering Japan to become trainees had been increasing 
since the foreign trainee system started in 1993, topping 100,000 in 2007 (‘Foreign 
trainees at Japan firms growing rare’. 2009).6 Nevertheless, this also takes place at a time 
when there are shortages of skilled labour, due to the changing demographics of the 
population and the changing labour market. 
Japan has been hard hit by the most recent global economic crisis. The Japanese 
economy was unable to sustain growth in 2008, due to a decline in export growth, and the 
economy recorded its first contraction since 2002. Corporate profits plunged and business 
investment fell. Unemployment rose until mid-2009, and most new positions created 
have been part-time rather than full-time permanent positions, meaning that there has 
been little growth in wages, and a resulting lack of consumer confidence (Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 2009: 143–5). The depth of the recession was 
July 2009, with some modest improvement from August 2009 (‘Unemployment rate falls 
to 5.5%’. 2009). 
In the current economic situation, there are regular calls for reform of the regulation 
of labour immigration (‘Plan to woo skilled workers urged’. 2009; ‘Point system eyed to 
attract foreign experts’. 2009). There is an implicit privileging of mental labour over 
physical labour encoded in immigration policy – a mind/body split whereby intellectual, 
white collar work is given recognition, but not manual and physical labour, and certainly 
not sexual labour (Mackie 2002: 200–229). Some élite white-collar workers enter Japan 
temporarily on working visas, and this is recognised under the rubric of 
‘internationalisation’ (kokusaika). These élite white-collar workers have much in 
common with the élite middle-class white-collar Japanese worker, except for their 
nationality and lineage.  The entry of such workers was facilitated by amendments to the 
Immigration Control Law (Shutsunyûkoku oyobi Nanmin Nintei Kanri-hô) in 1990, at the 
same time as it became possible for those of Japanese descent to enter Japan to work, 
albeit generally in less privileged occupations. 
The Japanese Department of Immigration does not explicitly permit immigration 
for the purpose of engaging in unskilled labour. There are, however, several major 
loopholes. Students may engage in limited part-time work, and some workers enter the 
country under the category of ‘trainees’ (kenshûsei). As noted above, a special category 
for those of Japanese ancestry has brought immigrants from Japanese-descended 
communities in Latin America to Japan as workers. Despite their Japanese ancestry, these 
workers often came to Japan with limited Japanese-language  skills and cultural 
competence, and thus were relegated to relatively unskilled occupations.  
It is seen as ‘natural’ that Japanese young people are increasingly reluctant to 
engage in manual work, and that these places may be taken by immigrant workers, even 
if illegally. The phrase ‘difficult, dirty and dangerous’ (kitsui, kitanai, kiken) used to 
describe these marginalised occupations aligns them with the abject (Mackie 1998: 45–
64). The relegation of these marginalised occupations to the least privileged members of 
society, including immigrant labour, allows members of the Japanese ‘mainstream’ to 
imagine themselves as fully middle-class, as engaged in white-collar ‘mental’ work rather 
than physical or unskilled work. The mind/body split is built into the very structures of 
modern capitalist societies like Japan, and is intimately entwined with class structure. The 
most prestigious occupations are those which have more of a mental component and less 
of a physical component. The use of immigrant labour in particular occupations means 
that these occupations come to be associated with particular ethnic groups, or, in other 
words: are ethnicised. This is the context for the immigration of workers of Japanese 
descent from the 1990s (Yamanaka 2000: 81). 
While much of the discussion of immigrant labour in other parts of Asia has 
focused on domestic work (Piper 2004: 216–231; Moya, 2007: 559–579; Misra and 
Merz, 2005: 9), Japan is relatively distinctive in not importing large numbers of domestic 
workers. The explanation for these distinctive patterns of immigration lies in the 
connection between the gendered division of labour, the labour market and demography. 
In Singapore, for example, middle-class educated women have been encouraged to stay 
in the full-time workforce in élite occupations, thus necessitating the employment of 
domestic labour (Cheah 2006: 178–266).7 In Japan, by contrast, the ‘double-burden’ of 
childrearing and paid work has often been handled by women leaving the full-time 
workforce in the years when their childrearing demands are heaviest, to return to the part-
time workforce when children are older (Osawa 2005: 111–129). The relatively flat 
income distribution in Japan also means that it is rarely feasible to employ domestic help. 
With the aging of the population and the plummeting birthrate, the pressing need is for 
the care of the aged and infirm.  
Because of the official prohibition on importing ‘unskilled’ labour, it is illegal to 
import labour for the purpose of domestic work, although anecdotal evidence suggests 
that some families are finding ways to employ overseas domestic workers. In one 
loophole, diplomatic personnel may employ domestic workers or chauffeurs who speak 
English, and this allows them to employ overseas workers. While such workers have a 
legitimate visa status, their home-based work does not come under the purview of the 
Labour Standards Law (Rôdô Kijun Hô, 1947), the legislation which regulates the 
working conditions of regular workers in workplaces such as offices and factories.8 
Many commentators, however, see international marriage as a form of labour 
migration. The women who immigrate as wives of Japanese men often provide domestic 
labour, childcare and care of the sick and aged in their marital families, not to mention 
engaging in paid labour in their communities (Itô 1992; Mackie 1998: 45–63; Piquero-
Ballescas 2009: 77–99). As Piquero-Ballescas points out, women who had originally 
entered as ‘tourists, entertainers, spouses/children of Japanese nationals, trainees or 
students’ were, in effect, ‘recruited as caregivers and providers of emotional labor in 
Japan’ (2009: 78). In a highly gendered labour market, women of the Nikkei community, 
too, have apparently often been employed as tsukisoi-nin (workers who provide informal 
personal care for the sick or elderly, rather than medical or nursing care) and some have 
actually come to Japan for that purpose (Tsuda 2003: 294; 297).  Once again, there are 
gendered expectations in the discourse on marriage and caring. 
Piquero-Ballescas’ comments on the relationship between immigration, the labour 
market and various forms of caring labour also remind us that, while immigration 
categories are rigid, individuals find ways of moving between these categories. Someone 
might initially enter on a tourist visa, but overstay to engage in various forms of 
undocumented paid labour. Or, someone may have originally entered as an entertainer 
(under an earlier visa regime), but enter into a relationship which transforms her into the 
‘spouse of a Japanese national’, and thus be eligible to apply for permanent residency. 
Regardless of state attempts to regulate the entry of various categories of residents, once 
within the boundaries of the Japanese nation-state, individuals inevitably form 
relationships with Japanese nationals or with other immigrants. The offspring of these 
relationships have been the subject of many of the recent controversies concerning 
nationality and residence category. It has recently been reported that ‘[o]ne in every 30 
babies born in Japan has at least one foreign parent’ and ‘about 6.5 per cent of all 
marriages in Japan in 2006 were international’ (McNeill et al 2009: unpaginated).The 
management of border control is thus intimately connected with the management of the 
labour market and the management of ‘biopower’ more broadly. 
Managing Borders 
The boundaries of the nation-state are policed through laws on immigration, 
residency, citizenship and naturalisation. The law defines visa categories which 
determine the conditions whereby an individual can live, work and form relationships 
within the boundaries of the nation-state. These visa categories may also determine 
access to benefits such as public housing, unemployment insurance, medical insurance, 
welfare benefits or medical treatment.9 Those who remain outside the boundaries of the 
nation-state include stateless persons and refugees (asylum seekers). Some individuals 
are in an intermediate category with limited rights to live and work within the boundaries 
of the nation-state, such as permanent residents, non-Japanese spouses of Japanese 
nationals, trainees, international students, skilled international workers, and residents of 
Japanese heritage. Others may be within the physical boundaries of the nation-state, but 
without a recognised status: undocumented workers who engage in work which is not 
compatible with their visa category, or ‘overstayers’ who remain in the country after their 
visa has expired.10  
The Constitution of Japan states, in Article 10, that ‘the conditions necessary for 
being a Japanese national shall be determined by law’. The laws which regulate the 
various categories of people resident in Japan include the Nationality Law (Kokuseki-hô, 
Law No 147, enacted 25 May 1950, effective 1 July 1950), and the Immigration Control 
and Refugee Recognition Law (Shutsunyûkoku oyobi Nanmin Nintei Kanri-hô, Cabinet 
Order No 319, enacted 4 October 1951, effective 1 November 1951; amended  1985, 
1990, 2004, 2006, 2009). Naturalisation is regulated by Articles 4 to 13 of the Nationality 
Law. These interact with the Family Register Law (Koseki-hô, Law No 224, enacted 22 
December 1947, effective 1 January 1948),11 Alien Registration Law (Gaikokujin 
Tôroku-hô, Law No 125, enacted and effective 28 April 1951), the Resident Registration 
Law (Jûmin Tôroku Hô, 1951, amended as the Basic Residency Records Law, Jûmin 
Kihon Taichô Hô, in 1967), and articles of the Civil Code concerning marriage and 
divorce.  
Once someone has entered the country, legally or illegally, their rights can be 
determined with reference to the various International Covenants. Japan has ratified the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1978), the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1978), the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, 1980), the Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees (1981), the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (1995), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(1994), but has not signed the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (Hatsuse 2005: 165–166) or the 
1980 Hague Convention on International Child Abduction. As in many other countries, 
the ability of migrant workers to claim rights under these conventions will often depend 
on the advocacy of non-government organisations (Piper 2004: 22). 
It should be noted that the boundaries of nationality and the geographical borders of 
the nation-state are not identical. Because nationality is determined on the jus sanguinis 
(bloodline) principle rather than the jus soli (place of birth) principle, it is possible to be 
born and raised within the physical boundaries of the nation-state without having 
Japanese nationality. Until 1985, the Nationality Law was based on patriarchal principles. 
It was assumed in Japan, as in many other countries, that fathers had the right to 
determine the nationality and domicile of family members. Only men had the right to 
pass on Japanese nationality to their children, and the provisions for naturalisation of 
foreign spouses were different for men and women. This became an issue after several 
cases of stateless children (with Japanese mothers and non-Japanese fathers) appeared. 
These provisions were modified in the mid-1980s, as the Nationality Law was overhauled 
in preparation for Japan’s ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Although the most blatantly sexist 
provisions of the Nationality Law were modified in 1985, the implementation of this law 
still has gendered implications. Both men and women have the capacity to pass on 
nationality to their children, but the child of a Japanese father and non-Japanese mother 
may only have the ‘right’ to Japanese nationality if the father provides official 
recognition (ninchi) of the child.  
The necessity for the father to explicitly provide recognition (ninchi) of his 
parentage has meant that it has been difficult for some non–Japanese mothers to claim 
Japanese nationality for the children of Japanese fathers. Furthermore, a child born out of 
wedlock between a Japanese father and a foreign mother could, until recently, get 
Japanese nationality only if the father admitted paternity during the mother's pregnancy, 
or if the couple married before the child turned 20. The Nationality Law has recently 
been revised so that a father can recognise paternity even after the birth of the child. This 
is the consequence of a Supreme Court ruling of 4 June 2008 that the provision of the law 
on children born outside marriage was unconstitutional (‘Ruling Slams Unequal Bias in 
Paternity Recognition’ 2006; Kamiya and Matsutani 2008; ‘No Paternity Pranks Yet, 
Cops Say’ 2009; ‘Three held in baby nationality scam’. 2009). 
The issue of paternity has taken on a further transnational dimension in campaigns 
for the recognition of the nationality of children of Japanese fathers and non-Japanese 
mothers born in other countries. Some are children born of Japanese fathers during World 
War II; others are offspring of temporary liaisons between Japanese tourists or sojourners 
and local women. A small number of the offspring of Japanese soldiers in the Philippines 
have been successful in claiming Japanese nationality (Agnote 2008; Agnote 2009). 
There have been several recent high-profile cases concerning overstayers. Maryam 
Amine, a twenty-year old Iranian student, was allowed to stay on as a foreign student 
after her parents and younger sister were deported in 2007. Her parents had entered Japan 
on short-term visas in 1990 and 1991 and had overstayed. She was recently granted a 
special residence permit by the Ministry of Justice and is expected to work as a nursery 
school teacher once she graduates (‘10-year overstayer is granted new visa’, 2009). In 
another protracted case, a thirteen-year old girl (born in Japan of Filipino parents who 
had entered on false passports and overstayed) was recently granted a special one-year 
residence permit in order to complete her education, but her parents were ordered to 
return home to the Philippines. The young woman, Noriko Calderon, will need to apply 
for a residence permit on a yearly basis, and may be able to apply for naturalisation on 
turning twenty. These high-profile cases have been advanced through the support of non-
governmental organisations and support groups. These young women provide a rather 
appealing image of the overstayer, and possibly distract attention from the large numbers 
of overstayers who are deported each year.12 According to the Immigration Bureau, there 
were 113,072 illegal foreign residents in Japan as of January 2009, after 39,382 were 
deported in 2008. Some 7,388 foreigners received special permission to stay in 2007 
(‘Filipino girl’s parents told to leave’. 2009; Fukue 2009a; Fukue 2009b; Fukue 2009c; 
Fukue and Matsutani 2009; Watanabe 2009). 
Currently, the systems of registering and tracking Japanese nationals and the 
systems of registering and tracking non-Japanese residents are separate. Japanese 
nationals have a family register entry, a resident registration and a nationality. Non-
Japanese residents have an alien registration card (Chapman 2008: 423–443). Under a 
Bill for the amendment of the Nationality Law and the Immigration Control Law 
(promulgated 15 July 2009), the two systems will be brought into line, and non-Japanese 
residents will have a residence (zairyû) card which will allow for closer tracking of their 
movements through the resident registration system. The new registration system will be 
administered by the Justice Ministry at national level rather than by local governments as 
occurs in the present system. While this appears neutral on the surface, in that the 
treatment of Japanese and non-Japanese residents will be more similar, advocates for 
immigrants fear that the result will be increased surveillance of non-Japanese residents 
(Hongo 2008; ‘Bill on Immigration Overhaul OK’d’ (2009); ‘Foreigners stage a sit-in 
outside Diet to protest immigration bills’. 2009; Matsutani 2009a; Matsutani 2009b; 
Matsutani 2009c; Matsutani 2009d; Matsutani 2009e; Nagata 2009a; Nagata 2009b; Ito 
2009; for the Bill to amend the existing laws, see Ministry of Justice. 2009). In order to 
highlight the workings of the twin themes of the management of borders and the 
management of bodies, I would now like to focus briefly on two groups: immigrant 
workers of Japanese heritage, and immigrant care workers. 
Labour immigrants of Japanese descent 
In 1990, the Immigration Control Act was modified to allow descendants of 
Japanese emigrants to enter Japan for up to three years, in a long-term resident category 
with no restriction on engaging in employment (Shutsunyûkoku Oyobi Nanmin Nintei 
Kanri-hô [Nationality and Refugee Recognition Law], as  amended 1990). Those who 
enter under this visa category may also bring their family members into Japan, and these 
may be people who have even less connection with Japanese society. The yearly 
admission of Brazilians quadrupled from 19,000 in 1988 to 79,000 in 1990. By 1996 
more than 200,000 Nikkeijin workers and their families had registered as residents in 
major manufacturing cities. (Yamanaka 2000: 71; Oka 1994: 41–49; Hatsuse 2005, p. 
160). By 2007, there were 317,000 Japanese Brazilians in Japan (Daimon 2009). 
In the 1990s, the temporary immigration of people of Japanese descent was seen as 
a more acceptable way of dealing with labour shortages than inviting ‘guest workers’ 
with no apparent ties to the Japanese nation-state. Although the Japanese heritage of such 
immigrants was probably expected to cut down on problems generated by perceptions of 
difference, local communities soon found they had to deal with contact between groups 
with different social and cultural expectations, while schools needed to address the 
necessity of multilingual and multicultural education for the children of these families. 
The co-existence of the descendants of Japanese emigrants reinforces the primacy of 
Japanese lineage, but also has the potential to undermine the naturalised assumption that 
blood-line equates with cultural competence. This assumption is a feature of many 
national cultures, as pointed out by Barry Hindess, ‘[n]otions of descent (and the 
apparently more respectable surrogate notion of a distinctive national culture that cannot 
readily be acquired by persons who are not born into it) have always played an important 
part in the way citizenship has been understood within particular communities’ (Hindess 
1992: 22).  
A labour ministry survey of companies in October 2008 found that there 
were some 486,400 foreign workers in Japan. Of these, 43.3 percent were 
Chinese, 20.4 percent Brazilians and 8.3 percent Filipinos. Many of these workers 
underpinned the production of cars and other exported products when the 
economy was good. In addition, many small firms and agricultural enterprises 
employed foreign trainees (‘Editorial: Support Needy Foreign Workers’. 2009). 
However, the national unemployment peaked at 5.7 per cent during 2009, and the 
automobile industry was particularly hard hit. This industry is concentrated in 
central Japan in Aichi prefecture, where an estimated 220,000 registered 
foreigners reside (Yamanaka 2000: 80).  
In April 2009 the government offered ¥300,000 to any unemployed immigrant 
worker of Japanese ancestry who wished to leave the country, and ¥200,000 each to 
family members, on the condition that they would not return to Japan. The government 
also allocated  ¥1.08 billion for training, including Japanese-language lessons, for the 
workers of Japanese ancestry (‘Axed Brazilians, Peruvians to be paid to leave Japan’, 
2009). Some local governments also started support programs for such workers. For 
example, in Aichi Prefecture, the prefectural government and business community 
established a fund to help immigrant workers learn Japanese. Several local governments 
also petitioned the national government for emergency support (26 cities request 
emergency support for foreign workers’. 2008) Hamamatsu City in Shizuoka Prefecture 
reported plans to train unemployed foreigners to work in nursing care, an attempt to 
implement change in what is a highly gendered and ethnicised labour market (‘Editorial: 
Support Needy Foreign Workers’. 2009). As Yamanaka points out, ‘immigration policy 
has created a labour force rigidly stratified by such collective characteristics as legal 
status, ethnicity, nationality, gender and skill level’ (Yamanaka 2000: 63). Nearly two 
decades later we are seeing the failures in planning for the long-term needs of the Nikkei 
communities. If we compare the history of the use of immigrant labour of Japanese 
descent with current attempts to use short-term immigrant labour in the caring 
professions, the segmentation of the labour market according to ethnicity, nationality, 
gender and skill level is thrown into sharp relief. 
Transnational Care Work 
Recent policies which provide insurance for the costs associated with the care of 
the aged attempt to come to terms with the social requirements of a population where the 
aged comprise an ever-increasing proportion of the population (Kaigo Hoken Hô/Law 
Concerning Insurance for Nursing Care, 1997, amended 2000). As a supplement to the 
care provided by family members, volunteers, paid carers and nursing professionals, the 
Japanese government is moving slowly on bringing in care workers from overseas. This 
is being managed by bilateral agreements with Indonesia and the Philippines.13 One 
reason for the cautious progress of these programs is the necessity to negotiate with 
advocates for the nursing and caring professions within Japan: the Japanese Nursing 
Association and the Japan Association of Certified Care Workers. 
The agreement with Indonesia was concluded in 2007, and the first care workers 
entered the country during 2009 and commenced training and language study. However, 
almost as soon as the first workers entered the country, concerns were being raised about 
the effects of the economic recession. In addition, fewer jobs were being offered than 
expected because of a perceived burden on facilities for supporting the Indonesian 
workers, including Japanese language education, and the commencement of a similar 
program with the Philippines in the same year. Japan was to accept up to 792 Indonesians 
in fiscal 2009, but the number of jobs offered by Japanese hospitals and care facilities 
totalled only 169 as of April 2009. The plan is to accept up to 400 nurses and up to 600 
caregivers over two years starting from fiscal 2008. A total of 208 Indonesian workers 
came in the first year of the program. Around 1,000 nurses and caregivers in Indonesia 
registered as applicants to work in Japan (‘Job shortage hits Indonesia nurses’ 2009). 
For those who started work in Japan during 2009, there were reports of language 
problems and issues in adjusting to a different workplace environment. All of the care 
workers admitted so far will work in hospitals and nursing facilities and not in private 
care. They will be expected to pass exams in three or four years in order to gain 
qualifications if they wish to stay on in Japan. They could in some ways, then, be seen as 
a specific form of ‘trainee’. They have been provided with a six-month language course 
which allows them to communicate in basic spoken Japanese, but much more specialised 
language training will be necessary in order to tackle the national caregiver qualifying 
examinations. The second group of Indonesian workers, up to about 800 nurses and 
caregivers, were planned to arrive at the end of 2009 (Kaneko 2009). 
The agreement with the Philippines (JPEPA) was signed in September 2006, but it 
took the Philippines Senate nearly two years to ratify it. Besides providing a framework 
for liberalising trade and investment between the two countries and allowing Filipino 
nurses (kangoshi) and caregivers (kangofukushi) to work in Japan, the agreement also 
detailed possible cooperative programs, including training courses for the regulation of 
and supervision of financial institutions, trade and investment cooperation, cooperation in 
the field of small and medium enterprises, technical cooperation in the field of science 
and communications technology and promotion of tourism. Under the agreement, 
Filipino nurses and caregivers were scheduled to arrive in Japan in 2009 and 2010 to 
undergo language training for half a year before going to work at hospitals and nursing-
care facilities across Japan. The nurses and caregivers are endorsed by the Philippine 
Overseas Employment Administration. The Japan International Corporation of Welfare 
Services (JICWELS) is responsible for finding hospitals and health-care institutions in 
Japan willing to hire the qualified Filipino nurses. It is planned to accept 1,000 Filipino 
workers over a two-year period (Piquero-Ballescas 2009: 78; Agnote 2008; ‘Filipino 
caregivers coming this year’. 2009).  
In the Philippines, more than 400 nursing schools are producing more nursing 
graduates than can be employed by hospitals and rest homes. Many of the fresh graduates 
are pinning their hopes on finding a job overseas. For those from the Philippines, who 
have been educated in English, however, other countries, such as U.S., Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand, and Britain may seem more accessible than Japan. Concern has also been 
expressed internationally about the exodus of medical professionals from developing 
countries to first world countries. This has prompted the World Health Organisation to 
develop the Global Code on International Recruitment of Health Personnel (Cheng 2009, 
pp. 111–112). As wealthy first world countries seek personnel from around the world to 
care for the bodily needs of their citizens, third world countries increasingly suffer from a 
lack of medical professionals, nurses and care workers to look after the needs of their 
own populations.  
Conclusions 
The issues currently being faced in contemporary Japan are a harbinger of issues 
soon to be faced by other advanced economies which are characterised by rising life 
expectancy and plummeting birth rates. To trace the circuits of labour mobility in the 
Asia-Pacific region is also to map the patterns of economic inequality in the region. The 
mobilisation of people as workers, citizens and members of reproductive families has 
hitherto mainly been considered within the frame of the nation-state, with reference to 
Foucault’s concept of ‘biopower’ (1980: 138-145). Globalisation, however, prompts us to 
consider questions of biopower on a regional and global scale, transcending the scale of 
the nation-state. The management of labour power, the management of populations and 
the management of care for the bodies of individuals also need to be considered in a 
transnational frame (Mackie and Stevens 2009: 269). Global corporations attempt to 
maximise profits through accessing cheaper labour power, while workers attempt to 
maximise their income through crossing national borders. Meanwhile, governments try to 
find ways of providing care for aging populations. Some who cross borders undertake 
occupations characterised as ‘dirty, difficult and dangerous’, while others cross borders to 
take care of the bodies of others in nursing, caregiving or domestic labour.  Nation-states 
attempt to regulate these flows through border controls. National governments like Japan, 
however, struggle to manage a labour market which is stratified and segmented according 
to gender, class, caste, ethnicity and nationality. Indeed, this segmentation is in part 
attributable to the ad hoc decisions on recruiting labour power through specific bilateral 
agreements. The body comes into play in distinguishing between prestigious, skilled 
occupations and less prestigious ones which are seen as unskilled and often seen as 
involving physical or manual labour. The body also comes into play in the need to 
provide care for those who are aging or infirm. The case studies in this article 
demonstrate that the management of border control and the management of the labour 
market are ultimately concerned with the management of bodies. 
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1 Research for this article was completed as part of an Australian Research Council-
funded project on The Cultural History of the Body in Modern Japan. 
2 ESCAP reports on the increase in the foreign population in Japan in recent decades: 
from 877,000 (0.7 percent) in 1990 to 2,048,000 (1.6 percent) in 2005 (Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 2009: 185). 
3 The most recent economic crisis has possibly challenged this belief. See Field (2009, 
unpaginated). 
4 Former Liberal Democratic Party Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirô instituted a 
program of fiscal restraint in 2006 which curbed increases in social security spending, but 
Koizumi’s policies have not been followed by subsequent governments (Fukada 2009). 
At the time of writing, the new Democratic Party of Japan Prime Minister Hatoyama 
Yukio was foreshadowing a greater emphasis on welfare in the national budget and a 
retreat from the large construction projects which had been a feature of Liberal 
Democratic Party governments. 
5 Needless to say, much of the discussion of issues concerning childcare, domestic labour 
and care for the disabled, infirm and elderly assumes a gendered division of labour and a 
nuclear family based on a heterosexual couple, notwithstanding challenges to these 
assumptions from feminist groups and advocates for male participation in childrearing 
(Roberts 2002: 54–91). When it comes to the care of the aged, however, because women 
have a higher life expectancy than men, and husbands tend to be older than wives, it is 
most likely that wives will outlive their husbands. 
6 Concerns have also been raised about the working conditions of trainees. It was recently 
reported that thirty-four people involved in training programs had died in fiscal 2008, a 
record high: the deaths were from work-related accidents, traffic accidents, and brain and 
heart disorders. Advocates for the workers have attributed these deaths to overwork 
(‘Overwork blamed for record-high 34 foreign trainee deaths’. 2009). 
7 Once again, much of the discussion of these issues assumes a heterosexual nuclear 
family with a gendered division of labour where women have the primary responsibility 
for childcare, childrearing, domestic labour and other forms of caring labour. 
8 It has been noted in several other national contexts that domestic workers do not come 
under the purview of labour legislation (Cheah 2006: 206–207; Piper 2004: 220; 
‘Editorial: The Rights of Domestic Workers’. 2009). 
9 Until relatively recently, some Japanese legislation included a clause which meant that 
certain welfare benefits or access to some public service positions was limited to 
Japanese nationals. In the Japanese literature this is known as the ‘kokuseki jôkô’ or 
‘nationality clause’. The ‘nationality clause’ was removed from several welfare laws in 
1982, and some teaching positions and academic positions have become available to non-
nationals in recent years (Chapman 2007: 68; 82) 
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